
CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STRATEGIC STUDIES



**SEVENTH PROFESSOR S.V. KOGEKAR MEMORIAL
LECTURE**

BY

AMBASSADOR MK BHADRAKUMAR, IFS (RETD)

**RELEVANCE OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU'S FOREIGN
POLICY IN TODAY'S WORLD**

26th May, 2014

CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STRATEGIC STUDIES

GOVERNING COUNCIL MEMBERS

Shri MK Mangalmurti, : President
IFS (Retd) : M

Air Chief Marshal (Retd) : M
H. Moolgavkar
(Ex-Chief of the Air Staff)

Admiral (Retd) : FM
JG Nadkarni : M
(Ex-Chief of the Naval Staff)

Dr. Madhav Godbole : M
(Ex-Home Secretary,
Govt. of India)

Prof. Gautam Sen : FM
(Former, Head, DDSS : M
And NISDA)

Lt Gen (Retd) : M
Amitav Mukherjee
(Former DG, Air Def. Arty.)

Lt Gen (Retd) Ashok Joshi : M
(Former Director General,
Military Trg., Army HQ)

Air Marshal (Retd) : M
S. Kulkarni
(Former Comdt., NDC)

Air Marshal (Retd) : Director
BN Gokhale : M
(Former Vice Chief of the
Air Staff, Air HQ)

Gp Capt (Retd) SG Chitnis : Dy. Dir./Secy./Tr.
: M

FM : Founder Member
M : Member

HONORARY LIFE MEMBERS

Shri R.D. Pradhan : M
(Ex-Governor,
Arunachal Pradesh)

Shri Abhay Firodia
Industrialist and Chairman,
Force Motors Ltd.

Shri Atul C. Kirloskar
Industrialist, Chairman & M.D.
Kirloskar Oil Engines Ltd.

CONTENTS

Item		Page
Welcome by Director	: Air Marshal (Retd) BN Gokhale	2
Seventh Professor S.V. Kogekar Memorial Lecture	: Ambassador MK Bhadrakumar, IFS (Retd)	4
Chairman's Remarks	: Ambassador MK Mangalmurti, IFS (Retd), President, CASS	20

Editor : Gp Capt (Retd.) S. G. Chitnis, VSM Deputy Director, CASS
Address Centre for Advanced Strategic Studies, MMDW Potdar
Complex, Pune University Campus, Pune 411007.
Telefax : 020-25697516 / Tel. : 020-25690182
E-mail : casspune@yahoo.com
Website : www.cfass.org.in

WELCOME BY DIRECTOR

AIR MARSHAL BN GOKHALE

Air Marshal BN Gokhale welcomed the dignitaries on the dais and every one present in the auditorium. He said that the Centre has been privileged to hold the Professor S.V. Kogekar Memorial Lecture every year since 2008. The first was delivered by Dr. Dileep Padgaonkar on "Indian Democracy : Its Strengths and Weaknesses", the second by Dr. Madhav Godbole on "Challenges Before the Fifteenth Lok Sabha", the third by Mr. Wajahat Habibullah on "Right to Information : Reality and Rhetoric", the fourth by Shri N. Gopalaswami on "Free and Fair Elections : Challenges Ahead", the fifth by Justice (Dr.) N. Santosh Hegde on "Probity in Public Life : Ethical Issues in Today's Administration" the sixth by Shri Kumar Ketkar on "Indian Democracy and Media : Emerging Concerns".

Air Marshal BN Gokhale said that we are fortunate to have Ambassador MK Bhadrakumar, IFS (Retd) to deliver the Memorial Lecture. He served in the Indian Foreign Service for three decades and as ambassador to Uzbekistan and Turkey. His assignments abroad included the former Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, West Germany, Kuwait, Pakistan and Afghanistan. He served thrice in the Iran-Pakistan-Afghan Division in the Ministry of External Affairs including as Head of the Division in 1992-95. He sought voluntary retirement from the IFS in 2002, and has since devoted himself to writing. He

contributes to various publications in Indian and abroad and is a regular columnist for Asia Times and The Hindu. He has written extensively on Russia, China, Central Asia, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan and on the geopolitics of energy security.

Air Marshal BN Gokhale said that we are happy that Ambassador MK Mangalmurti, IFS (Retd), President of the Governing Council of the Centre is chairing the event.

**PROFESSOR S.V. KOGEKAR
MEMORIAL LECTURE
AMBASSADOR MK BHADRAKUMAR,
IFS (RETD)
RELEVANCE OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU'S
FOREIGN POLICY IN TODAY'S WORLD**

Ambassador Mangalmurti, Air Marshal Gokhale, and Shri and Shrimati Madhav Godbole, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen,

To be invited to deliver a Memorial Lecture makes a humbling experience. It brings you face to face with immortality. When I received the invitation from Shri Madhav Godbole a couple of months ago to deliver the Memorial Lecture, I felt doubly honoured. To my generation of "civil servants", Shri Godbole was always a role model for his integrity and dedication, and I had the privilege of attending his meetings in North Block as Home Secretary in the early 1990s.

Indeed, Professor Kogekar strode like a Colossus in the intellectual life of Pune, itself a city with the noble tradition of being a fountainhead of India's modern political and cultural history. Professor Kogekar left an indelible mark as an academic, educationist and thinker. He moulded generations of Indian youth, many of whom in later years went on to occupy high positions in our national life in the field of politics and culture, government and the armed forces, economics and the media and so on. His seventh death anniversary falls today. I pay

tribute to his memory.

The topic I am going to speak on is the relevance of Jawaharlal Nehru's foreign policy for India in the contemporary world situation. I also speak out of personal conviction, and my talk today becomes much more than a spirited intellectual discourse in these unfriendly times when it has become fashionable to deride Nehru's foreign policy as archaic and irrelevant for meeting the demands of rising India.

But, before I begin, let me take note of an interesting and, probably, very significant coincidence. Tomorrow is the fiftieth death anniversary of Panditji. And while I am speaking, over there in Delhi, Mr. Narendra Modi is being sworn in as India's fifteenth prime minister.

Prime inister Modi's government enjoys a massive mandate from the people of our country. That makes it possible for him to make a "clean break" with the past in our national policies, apart from his forceful political personality and his vast experience in statecraft for over a decade.

Mr. Modi has not spoken much about foreign policy. The Bharatiya Janata Party's manifesto was rather taciturn on this subject. But three things can be made out, which are, arguably, quite 'Nehruvian' in orientation – namely, the primacy on political dialogue with India's neighbours, the strong hint that India will stand tall on the world stage, and, thirdly, a definite focusing on India's neighborhood and the Asian region.

I recently wrote that the hugely ambitious politician that he is, Mr. Modi could aspire to be India's Deng Xiaoping, a historic national figure, whose legacy rests on the success of his

leadership in lifting hundreds of millions of his countrymen out of poverty in a manner that human history had never known before, and in the process transforming China as a global power.

Prime Minister Modi is making an audacious beginning by reaching out to Pakistan with a gesture of goodwill. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has reciprocated. No doubt, it is a high-risk initiative, given the complexities of the regional security situation and Pakistan's domestic politics and the existence of "hardliners" in both countries.

The Indian "hawks" overlook that Mr. Modi's mandate largely rests on his development plank. There are high expectations on the part of the people, especially the you which is aspirational. Meeting these expectations isn't going to be easy. According to global investment bankers and financial institutions, India's growth rate cannot pick up in a near future due to a combination of the complexities of our investment cycle, various systemic constraints at work and India's federal set up where implementation is often enough at the state level. Most certainly, the Modi government has its task cut out for it. This is where the importance of a foreign policy that serves as an extension of the domestic policy becomes crucial.

Mr. Modi himself has repeatedly stated that his emphasis is going to be on economic diplomacy. It does not need much ingenuity to figure out that creating an external environment conducive for accelerating India's economic development and growth is bound to be the *leitmotif* of Mr. Modi's foreign policy outlook. I can't see our Prime Minister resorting to muscle-flexing vis-à-vis Pakistan – or waving the

“Tibet card” at China excitedly. That is simply not his priority.

I intend to stress three main templates of Nehru's foreign policy and examine their contemporary relevance – first, of course, non-alignment, second, Nehru's emphasis on Asian solidarity, and, thirdly, his rooted faith in politics and dialogue.

To begin with, let me go back to the world of Jawaharlal Nehru, the world of yesterday, and examine how it morphed into the world of today. Needless to say, Nehru's world was, qualitatively speaking, a very different world. And, yet, curiously, the fundamental themes have continued, and are easily recognisable. It was a world where the rising tide of history brought into existence many countries like India as newly independent countries leaving behind their colonial past. These newly liberated countries were embarking on a trajectory of new identity and were demanding equity and participation in the prevailing world order – just as today's emerging powers, which are also manifestly aspirational.

To be sure, this past fifty-year period since Nehru's departure has been a period of phenomenal shift in international politics. To borrow from the old Soviet concept of the correlation of world forces (which was of course a means of Soviet policy rather than a scientific construction), the actors, the forces, the character of the co-relation, and the role of the correlation in world development shifted in the five decades since the early 1960s when Nehru passed away.

The world did not exactly evolve according to the laws of history – towards socialism, as the Soviet ideologues predicted – but the correlation of power has continued to be on the global

scale (while at the same time it has a highly important regional scale) and the world equation of power has changed, while the principal competitors have continued to be present even today co-mingling with new entrants.

The 1962 Cuban missile crisis was the turning point in international politics in the Nehru era. It was the high noon of the Cold War, the only time that the two superpowers found themselves in an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation. It lasted for 13 momentous days and the world held breath.

However, looking back, it was also an event of rude awakening on the part of both the superpowers the United States and the former Soviet Union, as they realized that there are no victors in a thermonuclear war. Out of this 13-day confrontation in the autumn of 1962 nuclear disarmament process seriously began and the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 followed, prohibiting all testing of nuclear weapons except underground.

However, the most stunning development of the 1960s in the global balance of the "post-Nehru" era was the eruption of the Sino-Soviet rift in armed hostilities in Ussuri in 1969. This in turn prompted the Sino-American rapprochement, dramatically regrouping the global strategic chessboard. In turn, these two processes - MAD or Mutually-Assured Destruction and the US-China rapprochement - gave impetus to the concept of "peaceful co-existence" in the Soviet-American relations.

The general easing of geopolitical tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States can be traced to 1969 under

the Gerald Ford and Nixon administrations, but if a date is to be put on the high water mark of the détente process itself, it has to be the then Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev's visit to Washington in June 1973. Prima facie, how unrecognizably, the world politics had changed within a decade after Nehru's death!

But in reality, the more the things seemed to change, the more they remained the same. The Cold War continued under the rubric of détente and even after the signing of the famous Helsinki Accords in 1975. In fact, the Soviet-American rivalries took a new form and became more acute through involvement of surrogates, which led to a spurt in conflicts in what used to be known as the Third World. No region was spared – Africa, the Middle East, Asia or Latin America – and the rivalry took myriad forms ranging from guerilla war in the heart of Africa to right-wing military coups in Latin America.

What punctuated this phase of cold-war rivalry was the 1980 American presidential election, which saw Ronald Reagan being elected on a platform opposing the perceived concessions by the West to the Soviet bloc under the rubric of détente. The Reagan presidency took a directly hostile stance toward the Soviet Union aimed at the collapse of the USSR. It was characterized by a massive US military build-up. The so-called Reagan Doctrine openly sought the overthrow of all and any communist or leftist government. It also initiated new technologies such as the missile defence system with the intent to gain 'nuclear superiority' for the US.

When the unraveling of the Soviet bloc finally began by the end of the Reagan era, many factors contributed to it, which

we need not get into here, but two points need to be noted. First, the end of the Cold War was a negotiated settlement in the mid-1980s. When the unraveling of the Soviet bloc began – first in Poland followed by the other East European regimes one after the other like dominoes – Gorbachev refused to intervene in these dramatic happenings that ultimately culminated in the tearing down of the Berlin Wall in the autumn of 1989.

Equally, it was a decision by the then Russian President Boris Yeltsin as a matter of political expediency to disband the Soviet Union. Was the Soviet collapse inevitable? There are no clear answers. Certainly, it was not Mikhail Gorbachev's agenda to disband the Soviet Union. Nor is there any empirical evidence that the Afghan war accounted for it – or that the drop in the price of oil drove the Soviet economy into a terminal crisis. Put differently, the disbandment of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold war were two different events.

The US and its allies were actually taken aback by this torrential flow of events. This is important to take note because the subsequent triumphalism regarding the end of the Cold War and the “collapse” of the Soviet Union that crept into the American narrative was completely unwarranted and unnecessary. The plain truth is that no one really “won” the Cold War.

To recapitulate, the first twenty-five years of the “post-Nehru” era ended with the rollback of the Cold War. As we move on to the “post-Soviet” era, new vectors begin to appear, but the cold-war animosities – and the old mindsets, in particular – refused to wither away. In a nutshell, even in the weakened

form, Russia continued to be regarded by the US as a potential challenge in the medium term to its global hegemony. And, on the Russian side, the vast reservoir of suspicion regarding the US' intentions toward it lingered on. Influential sections within the strategic communities of both countries have failed to jettison old attitudes. Thus, in retrospect, it shouldn't cause surprise that the US not only rebuffed Boris Yeltsin's attempts to get Russia inside the European home and repeatedly humiliated it, but Washington was also being prescriptive toward Moscow.

Just about three years into the post-Cold War era, by 1994, the Bill Clinton administration had already brought forward a proposal for the eastward expansion of the NATO, going back on the understanding given to Gorbachev that the alliance would not move "one inch to the east" provided Moscow agreed to allow the German reunification. By the mid-1990s, Yeltsin was disillusioned with the US' triumphalist policies, heaping humiliations on Russia as if it were a vanquished enemy.

Nonetheless, steamrolling the Russian objection, the NATO intervened in the dismemberment of the former Yugoslavia and by 1999, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were inducted into the alliance. The three Baltic States and Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania followed suit in 2004. In 2009, Albania and Croatia joined the NATO. Today, countries, which have a stated goal of joining the NATO include Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Georgia. The crisis in Ukraine today quintessentially devolves upon the

Russian suspicion that there is a hidden Western agenda to induct the country into NATO, thereby bringing the alliance right to the Russian border within a distance of 300 kilometers from Moscow.

The reset in Russian-American relations, which the US President Barack Obama initiated in his first term, has petered out and has been replaced by a deepening distrust between Washington and Moscow. During the past 3-year period we have also witnessed the return of Russia to the world stage and an overall assertiveness in the Russian policies to advance the country's interests regionally and globally with an overall objective to compel the US to negotiate with it and to treat it on an equal footing.

The vastly increased income from energy exports has helped the rehabilitation of the Russian economy and the steady build-up of the Russian strategic power. This poses challenge to the US' global hegemony. The Syrian question turned into the first proxy war between Russia and the US in the post-cold war era. The stalemate in Syria cannot be broken without a US-Russia concord, but the prevailing friction between the two big powers do not allow that to happen.

Compared to the alignment of forces in Nehru's world, the contemporary world situation does not allow the formation of blocs of nations. The tendency is toward multi-polarity and several factors account for it. For one thing, multiple power centres have emerged, especially the emerging powers in Asia, which seek due recognition for their legitimate interests in the world order and are determined to pursue independent foreign

policies. Again, the locus of growth has been shifting to the Asian region, away from the West. Regional cooperation rather than bloc mentality is the preferred way forward in the mainstream Asian outlook.

Indeed, the nature of the global problems is also of a kind today that no individual power or even a "coalition of the willing" can solve them. The NATO's failure in the war on terror in Afghanistan and the chaos in Libya are telling examples. Meanwhile, Russia has succeeded in shedding the "enemy" image and has taken to globalization and integrated with the European economies. Ideology has indeed drained out of global politics.

The Ukraine crisis in many ways becomes a case study of the interplay of many of these post-cold war trends. One, much as Russia is resisting any NATO expansion further toward its borders, Russia still is manifestly keen that its ties with the European countries remain intact. Russia's priority still lies in its European identity. Although Russia's relations with China have reached a strategic level and are at their highest point historically, as the leaderships in both countries affirm, neither side desires an alliance. For both, in fact, relations with the West come first.

Equally, the Ukraine crisis brought out China's "positive neutrality" vis-à-vis the tensions between the West and Russia. On the other hand, European countries also harbor a sense of unease about the deterioration of relations with Russia. The major European countries, especially Germany, have been noticeably lukewarm about imposing sanctions against Moscow,

despite strong US urgings, given the appreciable level of interdependency in their relationships with Russia. The Kremlin, in turn, has heavily banked on Germany to ensure that the tensions over Ukraine do not degenerate into a confrontation with Europe. Never once Russia threatened that it would retaliate by cutting off its energy exports to Europe. This is not to say that Euro-Atlanticism has lost its *raison d'etre* but merely to point out that the cold-war era bloc mentality is palpably dissolving in Europe.

The question today really is not how Nehru's foreign policy becomes relevant but how it can optimally serve India's interests in the contemporary world situation that I have outlined. The issue here is about creatively adapting Nehru's foreign policy to meet today's circumstances. Indeed, that is also what Nehru would have expected of us to do. To my mind, this salience needs to be appreciated from the three different angles, which I cited at the beginning.

First and foremost comes the idea of non-alignment. There is often a mistaken notion of non-alignment being passive neutrality. Whereas, in Nehru's scheme of things, non-alignment was a way of leveraging India's position, of maximizing India's power without having to be part of any alliance system. On the occasion of the birth centenary of Panditji in 2009, Narasimha Rao wrote, "Non-alignment was not a negative policy of being neutral in great power disputes or staying equidistant from the two superpowers."

To quote from a speech by Nehru himself in the Parliament on December 9, 1958, "It is a policy inherent in the

circumstances of India, inherent in the past thinking of India, inherent in the whole mental outlook of India, inherent in the conditioning of the Indian mind.”

In the post-cold war discourses in our country, non-alignment had become a pejorative term signifying “diffidence” on India's part to become deeply engaged with the international community – meaning the West – as is apparently expected of a rising power. The prevailing advice of many pundits in our country is to seek our security by being part of the US' rebalance in Asia.

I have often wondered that part of the problem in our discourses today regarding Nehru's foreign policy lies in the mistaken impression that he was “anti-Western”. In reality, though, ideologically, Nehru was at home with the liberal principles such as democracy, liberty, equality, sovereignty and so on. The problem arose because he was often critical of the West for not adhering to those principles. Of course, Nehru also sought a fair international order, which found him critical of Western policies of hegemony.

For a while during the middle part of the last decade, India came dangerously close to advocating a “Quadripartite Alliance” with the US, Japan and Australia. It was projected as a concert of democracies but the barely-hidden intention was to conclusively bury India's non-aligned outlook by becoming part of a containment strategy toward China. Fortunately, the miserable idea failed to gain traction following the government changes in Japan and Australia. Quite obviously, I cannot see how an option of that sort – seeking our security through an

alliance system led by the US – would serve India's interests. India needs a creative solution to its strategic dilemma over China's rise and that should be most judiciously realized through the kind of strategic autonomy that a non-aligned policy represents.

That is to say, we should have the freedom and ability to judge each issue in the Asia-Pacific by its merits and assess its effects on India's interests. This is extremely important because China is our immediate neighbor and geography cannot be wished away; China's rise is a geopolitical reality and it is becoming irreversible; and, most importantly, there is a real possibility that China's economy can be a driver of growth for our own economy. Clearly, for the kind of massive investment we require for development of the infrastructure and manufacturing sector, China makes the ideal partner.

In sum, the solution to India's unique challenges and dilemmas vis-à-vis China must be one hundred percent Indian and it must be arrived at and worked out autonomously rather than by India hitch-hiking with the US' rebalance strategy. By the way, this approach of strategic autonomy is somewhat discernible in Mr. Modi's thinking about China and it seems to me that Beijing has duly taken note of it while forecasting that the bilateral relations are poised for an upswing in the coming period.

The “Nehruvian” vision attached high importance to Asian solidarity in world politics. One of Nehru's first acts in international diplomacy was to convene the Asian Relations Conference in 1947. Let me quote from Nehru's stirring speech at the conference: “For too long have we of Asia been petitioners

in Western courts and chancelleries. That story must now belong to the past. We propose to stand on our own legs and to cooperate with all others who are prepared to cooperate with us. We do not intend to be the playthings of others."

These words have proved prophetic. To be sure, the phenomenal economic growth of the Asian region has also led to negative developments such as the resurfacing of old territorial or historical disputes and antipathies to which India needs to take a clear-headed and practical view. In certain ways these tensions have been exacerbated wittingly or otherwise by the US' "pivot" to Asia. At any rate, just as Nehru would have visualized, an Asia of confrontation and crisis divided into blocs and alliances is certainly not in India's interests. As the leadership in India has affirmed, there is enough space in the present-day world for India and China to grow. The Indian officials have been on record that there are more issues of common interests today bringing India and China together than differences and disputes separating them.

A third pillar forming the architecture of Nehru's foreign policy was his steadfast belief that problems and threats cannot be solved through ideology or economic fixes or military means. Instead he thought through problems politically, case by case, and assessed where India's own interests lay, how they'd be affected and what could be India's options. Indeed, if only India had not been bogged down in the problematic relationships with Pakistan and India, it could have played a far more dynamic role in world affairs. Unfortunately, while India has done a reasonably good job in the recent decade in managing its relations with Pakistan and China, the progress in finding

solutions to the differences and disputes with these two neighbours has been tardy.

There are no military solutions to today's problems, as Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, Iran etc. amply testify. Yet, a kind of "militarization" of India's foreign policy has been taking place in the past decade. For nearly a decade we have been entrapped in a "catch-up" mentality vis-à-vis China, which was plainly unrealistic and unwarranted. Again, for the first time, India and Pakistan have been locked in a kind of proxy war in Afghanistan through the past decade-and-a half, which was bizarre since the cup of discord between the two countries was already overflowing without the great game in Central Asia.

The point I am making is that while the modernization of the Indian armed forces is a continuing necessity, there is no gainsaying the fact that India faces no threat of external aggression as such. Our main threats are emanating out of internal security. And this challenge needs to be largely addressed through a deft mix of coercion, rapid economic and social development, and partly by creating a relationship of mutual benefit with adversaries such as Pakistan or China.

Quintessentially, the problem in India's Pakistan policy remains to be that we have not succeeded in making that country a "stakeholder" in good-neighbourly relations. This is where strong economic linkages come in, such as the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline, which can contribute significantly to the amelioration of Pakistan's energy crisis. Similarly, we need to find a way to convince Pakistan that we are not interested in a turf war in Afghanistan. In conclusion, I would

say, we need to put politics in command of India's foreign policy and this is an area where we have fallen short.

Thank you all for the patient listening.

CHAIRMAN REMARKS
AMBASSADOR MK MANGALMURTI

We are thankful to Ambassador MK Bhadrakumar for his excellent speech. Since his retirement, he has devoted himself to writing contributing to various publications in India and abroad and is a regular columnist for several papers. He has covered a wide canvass today and brought us up to date on many international developments.

When I joined the Foreign Service in 1961, Jawaharlal Nehru was the most dominant national personality. It was natural for us to hero worship him. Over the years i have tried to take a more dispassionate view.

Jawaharlal Nehru being not only the Prime Minister but also the Foreign Minister was certainly the main architect of India's Foreign Policy in the early years after our independence. One of his major contributions was non-alignment that helped to navigate India and several other newly independent nations through the treacherous waters of the cold war. However, in later years after him we continued to flog this perhaps for too long- even after it had lost its relevance. Nehru left behind two vexing problems which are still with us today- The border dispute with China and the Kashmir issue. Perhaps both these issues could have been handled better although while judging him we now have the advantage of hindsight. His decision to decline the offer of a seat on the UN Security Council and to propose China's name also seems like a major mistake. His belief

in and efforts to bring about Nuclear Disarmament and General and Complete Disarmament appear naive in today's context. It might have increased his personal stature but did it benefit us? It also almost made us miss the bus on becoming a nuclear power and hampered the development of our arms industry.

Since our foreign policy has been a continuum, credit must be given to Nehru for setting the right course for us in many respects; although I must add that as compared to Nehru's times, today, we are much more pragmatic and professional."

**CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STRATEGIC STUDIES
CASS PUBLICATIONS**

Sl. No.	SEMINAR PROCEEDINGS	Date of Seminar
1.	“Defence and Industry” by RD Aga, Capt Prabhala, Cdre Das	17 May, 93
2.	“Use of Force in Internal Peace Keeping” by MS Gore, KF Rustamji, SC Sardeshpande, JG Nadkarni	04 Dec.93
3.	“The Emergence of China : Political, Economic and Military Implications for India” by CV Ranganathan, Shivshankar Menon, GP Deshpande, Dipankar Banerjee	22-23 Nov.94
4.	The First SLK Memorial Lecture by Shri P.Chidambaram, Union Minister for Commerce.	05 Jun.95
5.	“Human Rights : Law and Order in India” by Rajesh Pilot, Justice PB Sawant, Lakhera	30 Sep.95
6.	“The Emerging Security Environment in South East Asia with Special Myanmar : Political, Economic and Military Implication for India” by Uday Bhaskar, RS Kalha, Rakesh Ahuja, PMS Malik	02-03 Dec.95 Reference to
7.	“India 2020 : An Agenda for the Nation” by Maj Gen (Retd) KS Pendse.	Feb.96
8.	“India : The Nuclear Challenge” by EA Vas, KS Pendse, AA Athale	Mar.96
9.	“Challenges to India's National Security” and “India's Defence Preparedness” by Praveen Seth, Jasjit Singh	20-21 Apr.96
10.	“Citizens Rights and Indian Democracy” (Second SLK Memorial Lecture by Dr. P.C. Alexander, Governor of Maharashtra)	20 Jul.96

Sl. SEMINAR PROCEEDINGS No.	Date of Seminar
11. "Challenges of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Implications for India" by C Raja Mohan, SK Singh, Jasjit Singh	28 Aug.96
12. "Regional Security Environment to The North-West of India With Special Reference to Afghanistan." by VP Vaidik, Sushant Sarin, Ram Bapat, P Stobdan, Ashok Joshi	21-22 Mar.97
13. "Changing Scenario of The Constitutional Values" (Third SLK Memorial Lecture, by Justice AM Ahmadi, Former Chief Justice of India)	02 Aug.97
14. "Information Warfare"	24 Sep.97
15. "Laws of War" by NK Gupta, Malhotra	09 Jan.98
16. "Indian Ocean - The Challenges Ahead" by MP Awati, Laxmi Puri, PV Rao, Aditi Pant, Arun Prakash, A Narsimha Rao	06-07 Mar.98
17. "The Changing Pattern of India's Relations with America" (Fourth SLK Memorial Lecture", by Dr.Abid Hussain,Vice Chairman, Rajiv Gandhi Institute of Contemporary Studies)	03 Jul.98
18. "Pokhran II and its Implications" by VG Bhide, KS Pendse, Kapil Kak	01 Sep.98
19. "Nuclear India And The World" by K Subrahmanyam, Manoj Joshi, Jasjit Singh	08 Sep.98
20. "The Challenge of Terrorism" by Madhav Godbole, DB Shekatkar, A Narsimha Rao, VG Vaidya	29 Oct.98
21. "Foreign Policy Imperatives For Nuclear India" by Muchkund Dubey, Narsimha Rao, Meera Sinha Bhattacharjee, Mohd Moazzam Ali, Arvind Deo	26-27 Feb.99

Sl. No.	SEMINAR PROCEEDINGS	Date of Seminar
22.	“On Building a Globally Competitive Indian Industry: The Role of Research & Technology” (Fifth SLK Memorial Lecture, by Dr. R.A. Mashelkar Director General, Council of Scientific & Industrial Research)	22 Jul.99
23.	“Challenges of J&K” by Madhav Godbole, KV Krishna Rao, Arvind Deo, SG Pitre, Tara Kartha, Jasjit Singh	04 Feb.00
24.	“Indo-Pak Relations : Challenges Ahead” by K Raghunath, Arvind Deo, SG Pitre, Tara Kartha, Jasjit Singh	30-31 Mar.00
25.	“Self Reliant Defence and Indian Industry” (SLK Memorial Lecture - 2000 by Shri K. Subrahmanyam, Converner, NSAB)	18 Jul.00
26.	“Insurgency In India - Causes and Perspectives”	28 Dec.00
27.	“Governance In India : Challenges Ahead” by Madhav Godbole, VG Vaidya, DS Soman	25 Jan.01
28.	“India and China by 2020 : Political, Economic Sociological and Military Perspectives” by Surjit Mansingh, Manoranjan Mohanty, GP Deshpande, Shrikant Kondapalli	14-15 Mar.01
29.	“Global Terrorism And India's Response” by AS Kolaskar, RM Abhyankar, Savita Pande, G. Parthasarathy, Jasjit Singh, Arvind Deo, Shrikant Paranjpe, Santishree Pandit, HM Khanna	19-20 Mar.02
30.	“Globalization And Its Impact” (SLK Memorial Lecture by Dr. C. Rangarajan, Governor, Andhra Pradesh)	24 Apr.02
31.	“Shri N.K. Firodia Memorial Seminar : 2002” on “Governance In India” JG Nadkarni, Abhay Firodia, Madhav Godbole, VG Kanetkar, BN Deshmukh, BsKs Chopra, Ravi Pandit, NA Kalyani	03 Oct.02

Sl. No.	SEMINAR PROCEEDINGS	Date of Seminar
32.	“Globalisation And India” by Pai Panandikar, TK Bhaumik, Sunil Jain, Raman Puri, GD Sharma	19 Mar.03
33.	“Elections And Democracy in India” (N.K. Firodia Memorial Seminar by Mr. J.M. Lyngdoh, Former Chief Election Commissioner)	17 Feb.04
34.	“Comprehensive Security : Need of the Hour” by MK Mangalmurti, Bharat Bhushan, VM Ranade, KR Subramanian, Sanjay Baru, N Jayaram	25-26 Feb.04
35.	“Ombudsman, Lokayuktas, Lokpals ; Concept and Working, with Special Reference to State of Maharashtra” by Justice VP Tipnis, former Lok Ayukta of Maharashtra	25 Mar.04
36.	“Comprehensive Security II : Economic And Internal Security” by VS Chitre, Madhav Godbole, Sunil Bhandare, Dinakar Prasad, Nitin Gokhale	03 Mar.05
37.	“India And Its Neighbours : A Regional Security Perspective” by Satish Chandra, IP Khosla, KV Rajan, Deb Mukharji, PJ Jacob, Madhav Godbole	04 Jan.06
38.	“Probity And Propriety In Public Life” (Yashwantrao Chavan Memorial Seminar by Shri Milind Gadgil, Journalist)	03 Feb.06
39.	“Social Unrest in India : Challenges Ahead” (Yashwantrao Chavan Memorial Seminar by Dr. DN Dhanagare, Former Vice Chancellor, Shivaji University, Kolhapur)	13 Mar.07
40.	“Emerging World Order And Sino Indian Relations” CV Ranganathan, Tapan Bhaumik, Brahma Chellaney, SCS Bangara, Shrikanth Kondapalli, Madhav Godbole	21 Mar.07

Sl. No.	SEMINAR PROCEEDINGS	Date of Seminar
41.	“Aerospace Power in a Changing National Security Environment” (Air Marshal YV Malse Memorial Lecture by Air Chief Marshal FH Major, PVSM, AVSM, SC, VSM, ADC, Chief of the Air Staff)	28 Jul.07
42.	“Future Environment, Perceived Threat Preceptions And Imperatives in Response” (Brigadier NB Grant Memorial Lecture by Lt Gen N. Thamburaj, SM, G.O.C.in.C., HQ, Southern Command)	02 Dec.07
43.	“Indian Democracy : Its Strengths & Weaknesses” (Professor S.V. Kogekar Memorial Lecture by Dr. Dileep Padgaonkar)	25 May,08
44.	“India's Strategic Environment And Its Implications for Military Modernisation” (Air Marshal YV Malse Memorial Lecture by Dr. Bharat Karnad)	08 Jul.08
45.	“Indo-US Relations : The Changing Perspective” by Lalit Mansingh, Bharat Karnad, AN Prasad, V Balachandran, RK Chopra,Prakash Shah	22 Oct.08
46.	“Challenges Before the Fifteenth Lok Sabha” (Professor S.V. Kogekar Memorial Lecture by Dr. Madhav Godbole, Former Home Secretary, Govt. of India)	26 May,09
47.	“West Asia : A Factor in India's Security and Foreign Relations” by Prakash Shah, Ishrat Aziz, AK Trikha, Talmiz Ahmad	21 Apr.10
48.	“Secularism in India : Meaning And Practice” (Yashwantrao Chavan Memorial Lecture delivered by Justice N. Chapalgaonkar (Retd)	14 May,10
49.	“Right t Information : Reality and Rhetoric” (Professor S.V. Kogekar Memorial Lecture by Mr. Wajahat Habibullah, Chief Information Commissioner, Govt.of India)	26 May,10

Sl. No.	SEMINAR PROCEEDINGS	Date of Seminar
50.	“Essentials of an Aerospace Power : Indian Context” (Air Marshal YV Malse Memorial Lecture by Air Marshal PK Barbora, PVSM, VM, ADC, Vice Chief of the Air Staff, IAF)	09 Jul.10
51.	“Naxalism and Maoism and Indian Army” DB Shekatkar, Hemant Mahajan, BT Pandit	26 Aug.10
52.	Indo-Pak Relations and The USA” RR Palsokar	17 Sep.10
53.	The Kashmir Imbroglio” Hemant Mahajan, Pramathesh Raina, VY Gidh, DB Shekatkar	29 Oct.10
54.	“Value System in the Armed Forces” (Brigadier NB Grant Memorial Lecture by Lt Gen (Retd) Ashok Joshi, PVSM, AVSM)	18 Dec.10
55.	“Poverty Alleviation in India : Challenges Ahead” (Yashwantrao Chavan Memorial Lecture by Dr. YSP Thorat, Former Chairman, NABARD & Chief Executive Officer, Rajiv Gandhi Charitable Trust, New Delhi	13 Jan.11
56.	“India and East Asia : Opportunities Ahead” Leela Ponappa, Vijay Sakhuja, RN Das, Rajiv Kumar Bhatia	23 Mar.11
57.	“Free and Fair Elections : Challenges Ahead” (Professor S.V. Kogekar Memorial Lecture by Shri N. Gopaldaswami, Former Chief Election Commissioner)	26 May,11
58.	“The Arab Spring : Meaning, Causes and Implications” Amitava Mukherjee, KP Fabian, Navdeep Singh Suri, FR Siddiqui	24 Feb.12
59.	“Probity in Public Life : Ethical Issues in Today's Administration” (Professor SV Kogekar Memorial Lecture by Justice (Dr.) N. Santosh Hegde, Former Lokayukta, Karnataka	27 May,12

Sl. No.	SEMINAR PROCEEDINGS	Date of Seminar
60.	“The Future of Aerospace Power” (Air Marshal YV Malse Memorial Lecture by Air Chief Marshal (Retd) PV Naik, PVSM, VSM, Former Chief of the Air Staff, IAF)	29 Jun.12
61.	“A Gandhian Perspective on International Security” (Yashwantrao Chavan Memorial Lecture by Ambassador P.A. Nazareth, IFS (Retd)	03 Jan.13
62.	“Indian Army Modernisation : An Assessment” (Brigadier NB Grant Memorial Lecture by Maj Gen (Retd) RK Arora, CEO and Editor, Indian Military Review Media Pvt. Ltd.)	14 Feb.13
63.	“Indian Democracy and Media” (Sixth Professor SV Kogekar Memorial Lecture by Shri Kumar Ketkar, Chief Editor, Dainik Divya Marathi)	26 May,13

CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STRATEGIC STUDIES

The Centre for Advanced Strategic Studies (CASS), Pune was registered on 21st September, 1992 under the Society's Registration Act, 1860, and as a Charitable Public Trust on 28th October, 1992, under the Bombay Charitable Public Trust Act of 1950. The Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, Ministry of Science and Technology, Government of India have accorded recognition to CASS as a Scientific and Industrial Research Institution. The Centre has been granted IT exemption U/S.80G and U/S 10(23C) in vide Government of India notification No. 80/2007 which is now in perpetuity. Section 80G gives fifty percent exemption to the donors.

The Centre aims at undertaking research and analysis of subjects relating to national and international security and development through seminars, discussions, publications at periodical intervals and close interaction with the faculty members and research students in allied disciplines in the Universities/Institutions and the Armed Forces. It expects to award research fellowships as soon as its corpus builds up and makes it possible. It aims to generate and promote interest among the academicians and public in these subjects with a view to making them alive to national security concerns. It has received very valuable support from the University of Pune in all its activities, specially from the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies. It has an Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Yashwantrao Chavan Academy of Development Administration (YASHADA) enabling mutual collaboration for making available their infrastructure, publications and teaching and research activities. The Centre has held a number of seminars, panel and group discussions.

ADDRESS :

Centre for Advanced Strategic Studies
M..M.D.W. Potdar Complex, Pune University Campus
Pune - 411 007
Tele Fax No. : 020-25697516
Tel. No. : 020-25690182
Email : cass182@bsnl.in